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THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION: BLACK TRADE UNIONS, WORKPLACE
FORUMS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA
C. Matthew Smith*
We know through painful experience that freedom is never
voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by
the oppressed.
Martin Luther King, Jr.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, the story of labor relations in South Africa has run lockstep
with the story of apartheid.2 The earliest of its labor laws were enacted for the
benefit of white laborers only-and worked to the detriment of black laborers
The Mines and Works Act of 1911, for example, established quotas for black
and white workers4 and reserved certain better paying jobs in the mines for
whites only.'
That would only be the beginning. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924
followed the bloody Rand Revolt,6 a three-month strike to protest the lowering
* J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
'MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM THE BIRMINGHAM CITY JAIL 8 (Harper Collins
1994) (1963).
2 See Stephen H. Jacobson, Comment, Collective Bargaining in Undemocratic Regimes:
Francoist Spain and Contemporary South Africa, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 214, 225 (1991); Karon
M. Coleman, Comment, South Africa: The Unfair Labor Practice and the Industrial Court, 12
COMP. LAB. L.J. 178, 178 (1991); Bob Hepple, Trade Unions and Democracy in Transitional
Societies: Reflections on Russia and South Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR LAW: ESSAYS
FOR PAUL O'HIGGINS 56, 56 (K.D. Ewing et al. eds., 1994); Mark Mitchell & Dave Russell,
Black Unions and Political Change in South Africa, in CAN SOUTH AFRICA SURVIvE?: FIvE
MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT 231,231 (John D. Brewer ed., 1989); William B. Gould, Black Unions
in South Africa: Labor Law Reform and Apartheid, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 99, 99 (1981); Paul
Lansing, South African Changes in Industrial Relations Law: First Crack in Apartheid?, 3
COMP. LAB. L. 291,291 (1979).
' See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 225.
4 See id. at 225-26.
s See Coleman, supra note 2, at 182; Lansing, supra note 2, at 294-95. Suchjob reservation
tactics were implemented again in the Bantu Building Workers Act of 1951, which prohibited
blacks from taking "skilled" construction jobs in white urban areas. See Lansing, supra note 2,
at 295.
6 See Lansing, supra note 2, at 292.
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of wages and the granting of more semi-skilled jobs to Africans.7 The national
government was so threatened by the strike that it called in military planes and
infantry. By the end, one report estimated that 153 people were dead and 534
injured.' Another scholar estimated that there were 247 dead and 591 injured.9
The act aimed to prevent any similar worker unrest by allowing employees
to bargain collectively with their employers through registered trade unions.
Such bargaining occurred in one of two forums: voluntarily formed industrial
councils, consisting of equal numbers of union and employer representatives
or temporary conciliation boards, constructed by the Ministry of Manpower
when the disputing parties had not formed a council of their own.'
Nevertheless, the act excluded black workers from the term "employee,"
thereby protecting collective bargaining rights for whites only." Thus, any
black unions that might form could not avail themselves of the dispute
resolution mechanisms provided for in the act.
Nor did the rewriting of the act in 1956 (later renamed the Labour Relations
Act of 1956) provide any real relief from these strictures. Black unions still
could not register independently with the government and thereby receive legal
sanction for collective bargaining activities. 2 Moreover, while racially
parallel unions (in which black and white branches existed side by side) were
permitted, the white and black branches remained separate. Mixed meetings
were prohibited, and the white branch bargained for the agreement that would
set the rights for both groups of workers in the workplace."
Even the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act of 1953 effectively did
nothing to alter the prevailing apartheid-driven system. It established a
separate bargaining arena for blacks in which liaison and worker committees
brought issues to the attention of the employers. 4 Such committees, however,
generally addressed minor issues and often suffered from the obvious
ineffectiveness of the means permitted" as well as from disuse. 6
7 See id.
s See id. at 292 n.6.
9 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 182 n.28.
'0 See id. at 182-83; Lansing, supra note 2, at 293.
" See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 226; Lansing, supra note 2, at 293.
12 See Jacobson, supra note 2, at 226.
" This "parallel" system would persist well into the 1970s with certain fluctuations in the
frequency of its implementation. See id.
'4 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 184.
's See Lansing, supra note 2, at 294 (noting that a later form of this act, the Bantu Labour
Relations Regulations Amendment Act of 1973, explicitly stated that any agreements reached
between a work committee and an employer would not be legally binding upon the employer).
16 See id.
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South African lawmakers, however, failed to take proper account of the
sheer mass of disenfranchised black workers in South Africa. Once those
workers recognized the collective political power they possessed, they began
to oppose the prevailing system through large and very sophisticated trade
unions. Under such conditions, it was inevitable that the laws would give way.
But the trade unions' impact may not be limited simply to South Africa's labor
laws. Indeed, these organized and highly democratic groups may have helped
to make possible the tumbling of apartheid in South Africa altogether.
Part I of this Note will recount the historical role of black trade unions in
the inner turmoil of the apartheid era and in that hegemony's eventual demise.
Part II will examine the most significant innovation of South Africa's Labour
Relations Act of 1995, the workplace forum, in the wake of the nation's
reformation. Further, this paper will explore ways in which this innovation
does or does not fulfill the promise of democracy, both within the workplace
and the nation as a whole, for which so many fought during the apartheid
struggle.
II. THE FIRST STEPS
A. Humble Beginnings
A number of scholars credit black trade unions with mobilizing the
populace against the entire political system of apartheid.' 7 This idea is not that
surprising when one considers the role labor laws played in crippling the
power and the will of black South Africans to oppose the state. Fighting
against the economic stranglehold of the government on black workers
inevitably meant fighting against the discriminatory political spirit behind
those laws. Both practically and symbolically, the labor laws of South Africa
embodied political inequality."8
' See, e.g., Darcy du Toit, Corporatism and Collective Bargaining in a Democratic South
Africa, 16 IMus. L.J. 785, 785-86 (1995); Hepple, supra note 2, at 56 ("In South Africa ... the
grassroots strength of the union movement provides a spear for the development of a
participative democracy and a potential shield against political repression by a new elite."). For
a more cautious critique of the strengths and weaknesses of the black unions as policy shapers,
see generally Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2.
'" See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 238 ("Of course, it was always totally unrealistic
to imagine that the black unions would ever abstain from politics when the South African state
itself interferes and intrudes into every aspect of the working lives of black workers.").
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In the 1950s, South Africa experienced a new "wave of African
militancy."' 9 The momentum of this movement "was drawn partly from the
shop floor," with the amount of labor disputes and striking workers doubling
over the numbers of only a few years earlier.20 At the same time, black unions
also began involving themselves in the political process.2' For example,
rumors abounded that the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU),
a large multi-union cooperative, was somehow connected with the South
African Communist Party.22 One of the earliest confirmed alliances between
labor and politics was that between SACTU and the African National Congress
(ANC), the predominant political party of the black population of South
Africa.' Similar coalitions continue to exist today, perhaps the most
important being the alliance between the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) and the ANC.24
Scholars, however, point out that the black trade unions of the 1950s and
1960s, despite newfound militancy and political alliances, largely failed to
affect national policies because of their "top-down" structure.5 The unions'
emphasis on enlistment of large numbers of workers for the purpose of
amassing popular clout made them vulnerable to governmental opposition. By
simply imprisoning a small number of key organizers and officials, the state
could render a sizeable union an ineffective mass.26
'9 Deborah Posel, 'Providing for the Legitimate Labour Requirements of Employers':
Secondary Industry, Commerce and the State in South Africa During the 1950s and Early 1960s,
in ORGANISATION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 199, 213 (Alan Mabin ed., 1989).
20 Id.
2 Two distinct philosophies emerged in black unions. The "workerist" unions refused to
focus their attention outside of the workplace and workplace disputes. "Populist" unions, on the
other hand, recognized their grassroots political power and sought both to utilize it through
political strikes and to maximize it through coalitions with political parties. Moreover, some of
the traditionally workerist unions have adopted more populist approaches over time. See
Jacobson, supra note 2, at 231-32. In the remainder of this Note, unless otherwise indicated,
references to black unions will include only those operating under a populist philosophy.
22 See MERLE LIPTON, CAPITALISMAND APARTHEID: SOUTH AFRICA, 1910-1984 173 (1985).
' The African National Congress effectively took power over South Africa in recent years
with the election of its president, Nelson Mandela. See The Triumph of Moderation,
ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 43.
24 This coalition ift recent years has received credit from many (and repudiation from many
others) as the prime influence behind numerous ostensibly pro-labor laws, including the new
Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1996. See Sven Lunsche, Job Figures Show Up ANC's
Poor Track Record, Bus. TIMES (South Africa), Nov. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS-NEXIS,
World Library, TMLBLT file.
2 See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 233.
26 See id. at 233.
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The government, recognizing this considerable chink in black labor's
armor, took full advantage. The aftermath of the Sharpesville massacre of
1960 illustrates the point well. After a political demonstration in Sharpesville
was violently ended when the South African police shot some sixty-seven
African participants,27 the government effectively shut down the black trade
union movement through the arrests of key union leaders.28 Indeed, the South
African government was so successful that the "onslaught on African
unionisation" in the 1950s and 1960s was one factor leading to "an abundant
supply of cheap African labor."29
Similarly, strikes in Durban in 1973 and the Soweto uprising of 1976
resulted in arrests of and banning orders against key union players. This state
retaliation threatened once again to put an end to black trade unionism.
30
The government attempted to use parallel unions such as those discussed
above to fill the voids that such crack-downs left.3 1 Such measures apparently
had a placebo effect in the 1960s. Indeed, in no year during that decade did
the total number of striking black workers exceed two thousand.32
The dormancy ended, however, in 1973. Angered by the period of
"excessive" privilege that whites enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s, African
laborers had had enough. 3 There was an "explosion of strike activity."'
Moreover, an entirely new kind of union structure emerged that could not so
easily be toppled, along with a "union militancy" that lent unprecedented
momentum to the movement.3 5
South Africa felt the effects of this new era almost immediately. An
estimated 100,000 black workers were striking in that first year alone.36
Moreover, the white establishment's reactions in 1973 and 1976, while
managing to bring about a suspension of activity,37 fell far short of halting the
27 See T. C. Moll, "Probably the Best Laager in the World": The Record and Prospects of
South African Economy, in CAN SOUTH AFRICA SURVIVE?, supra note 2, at 136, 136.
28 See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 232; Hepple, supra note 2, at 67.
29 Posel, supra note 19, at 199.
30 See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 233.
3' See id. at 232.
32 See id.
33 See PATRICK BOND, COMMANDING HEIGHTS & COMMUNITY CONTROL: NEW ECONOMICS
FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 30 (1991).
34 Id.
31 See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 232.
See id.
37 In addition to the arrests of key union officials, the government attempted to erect a
"committee system" for African workers as an alternative to trade unions. There were two kinds
of committees implemented. In the first, members of the committee were wholly elected by
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movement of black unionism altogether. Indeed, the 1980s would see black
strikers in numbers never seen before.38 What is more, the new strategy
proved far more effective. Wage increases in the 1970s and 1980s resulted
from the increasing clout of black trade unions.39
The endurance of these newer generation unions, according to some critics,
came from their emphasis on involving the rank-and-file workers in making
decisions.4 This democratization had the practical effect ofproducing "deeper
organisational roots," making these unions harder to topple than their top-
heavy predecessors.4 ' No longer could the arrest or banning of a few
principals render a union helpless. The remainder of the union, which also was
involved in every aspect of the union's decisions and direction, could carry on
without them.
The more democratic union's) political significance, however, was not
limited simply to labor disputes. For the first time ever, large numbers of
Africans found a mouthpiece for their grievances with not only their respective
employment situations but also with apartheid as a whole.42 Direct voice in the
political process through involvement in political parties had been taken away
from them by the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968." 3 Thus,
they naturally turned to the one mechanism that allowed them to air their
anger."
workers. In the other, the committee body was partly appointed by management and partly
elected. Approximately halfa million African workers were employed in workplaces featuring
this'system within a few years after the system was created. See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 67-
68. In addition to the government's own efforts, large white trade unions also attempted to quell
this black labor surge. TUSCA, a large and influential white trade union federation, began
organizing black workers in the mid-1970s. However, vocal black unions accused TUSCA of
targeting only shops where black workers had become "active" and then quelling this activity
"by setting up 'tame' parallel unions." Id. at 204.
38 See id.; Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 232. In 1987, lost man-days due to strikes
reached an astonishing nine million. See Marcia Klein, Signs of Frustration in Strike Action,
Bus. TIMEs (South Africa), Aug. 2, 1998, at Appointments 1, available in LEXIS-NEXIS,
World Library, TMLBT File.
9 See BOND, supra note 33, at 31.
0 See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 233.
41 See id. at 233, 244.
42 See Hepple, supra note 2, at 69 (asserting that "the union movement was the only
legitimate organization of the voteless majority of South Africans" until after de Klerk's
pronouncement in February 1990 effectively ending apartheid).
4 See Lansing, supra note 2, at 301.
"See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 173 (noting the widely-held contemporary belief that "until
acceptable political institutions emerged, black frustration and anger were likely to spill over
into the workplace").
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The populist notion that unions should respond to all needs within the
African communities took center stage as unions began making their presence
felt in political as well as workplace disputes. When the government
attempted to raise township rents and public transport fares, the unions
protested by organizing rent strikes and bus boycotts within African communi-
ties."' Indeed, these concerted efforts may serve to best illustrate the
intersection between labor and politics in South Africa. The laws implemented
to further oppress the African population as a whole had a direct effect upon
laborers and forced unions to operate outside the shop on their members'
behalf." Further, laws aimed at destroying the black union movement
naturally would have a direct effect upon a large segment of the population.47
Moreover, when unions stepped outside the plant to battle more general
apartheid laws, whatever victories they enjoyed benefitted not only their
workers but also those, such as the growing mass of unemployed Africans,
who for whatever reason had not managed to organize themselves. Populist
unions knew that this division between the employed and unemployed could
prove self-destructive to a comprehensive African movement. The workerist
focus had the dangerous potential of splitting the voice of the African
population. When advances were made in the workplace but in no other
segment, socio-economic stratification would inevitably result."
This broader function of populist unions, to act as the mouthpiece of the
entire disenfranchised population, may also have found encouragement,
ironically, in the South African legal system itself. For example, the laws
requiring blacks to live in separate "homelands" and work camps placed both
union organizers and employees in a shared "social setting." This communal
situation may have helped to establish the union in the social consciousness as
not merely "representatives of labor interests" but also "political forces in the
anti-apartheid movement."5°
This greater role for black unions, moreover, would be summarized nearly
a decade later by an Industrial Court justice in words that could as easily have
been spoken in these earlier years of the movement. The justice wrote "Black
" See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 241-42.
"See id.
47 As of 1980, 64.4 percent of the 8.7 million working South Africans were black. Further,
88.1 percent of the unskilled labor in the production sector were black. See Coleman, supra note
2, at 181 (citing Piron & Le Roux, South Africa, 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR
LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 13 (R. Blanpain ed., 1986)).
" See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 239-41.
" See Coleman, supra note 2, at 206-07.
5 Id.
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workers.., do not have the franchise and have no representation in parlia-
ment, consequently their opposition to any legislation which directly affects
their lives has, of necessity, to find other means of expression."'" The unions,
with their democratic organizational structures and methods of applying great
economic pressure, became those "other means."
B. The Post- Weihahn Reforms and the Industrial Court
The South African government, quick to recognize the burgeoning political
threat of black trade unions, responded by establishing the Weihahn Commis-
sion in 1979. The purposes of the commission ostensibly included researching
the underlying causes of the country's labor unrest and then reporting back to
Parliament with recommendations on how to remedy those causes through
updated laws. 2 Scholars have located in the amendments to the act made
pursuant to the commission's recommendations a sinister underlying motive.
While the reforms purported to grant numerous collective bargaining rights to
black trade unions, the legislation in fact "attempt[ed] to coopt and incorporate
the black trade unions into the established system of industrial conciliation.
5 3
To understand this criticism, one first must examine the features of these
reforms as enacted in the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979
("Amendment Act"). For the first time, black trade unions were given
permission to register with the government. This was important because,
under the act, statutory employees could legally join registered unions.'
Registration brought the unions a recognition and legitimacy never before
enjoyed.
In fact, the Amendment Act provided incentives for registering. In
exchange for doing so, the union received the right to organize openly, to
participate in industry-wide collective bargaining through Industrial Councils,
s' Gana & Others v. Building Materials Mfr. Ltd. t/a Doorcor, (1990) 11 I.L.J. 565 (LAC).
52 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 185.
s Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 235; see also Hepple, supra note 2, at 68 (arguing
that coopting the unions would make them more controllable). Compare, however, with the
optimistic (albeit reservedly) approach taken shortly after the enactment of the post-Weihahn
reforms in Lansing, supra note 2, at 301-02. The author, while admitting that the broad
discretionary powers reserved for the government under these reforms ultimately could aid in
the squelching of black unions, concluded that government "goodwill" in implementing the
reforms could actually give the laws "a chance of success in bringing about the beginnings of
industrial peace in South Africa." Id. While this policy shift would indeed yield the "first crack
in apartheid," it would not be due to government goodwill but for altogether different reasons
discussed infra.
' See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 68.
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to engage in strike activity as a last resort, and to bring unfair labor practice
charges before the newly established Industrial Court (IC) 5
These reforms, however, in fact proved limited in their grant of rights and
remarkably subversive to their facial purpose of promoting industrial peace
through equal collective bargaining opportunity. For example, the law
required each registering union to submit a constitution to the National
Manpower Commission for approval. Moreover, before approval would be
granted, the union would have to demonstrate that it was a non-political
entity." What is more, the amendments prohibited the unions from contribut-
ing financially to political parties. 7
These prerequisites demonstrated a desire by the government not to allow
black unions to flourish but to effectively remove their political sting." By
inviting them into the fold, the state could more closely monitor and regulate
their activities." And, to ensure that an approved union did not later develop
an undesirable agenda, the Registrar retained the power to withdraw its
registration.60
In addition, what progress the black unions could make was limited to
bargaining for industry-wide standards rather than for improvements at any
particular workplace.6' Such restriction aimed to limit the unions' grassroots
effectiveness by preventing the more democratic factory-based committees
from dealing with employers directly.62
Here again the reforms aimed to eliminate union strength at its core-the
localized rank-and-file structure. 63 Practically speaking, each union's shop-
specific body of workers would have to join forces with other shops' workers,
reach a consensus with regard to their desires, and take on the industry as a
whole. Victories would be far more difficult to achieve this way than by
exercising shop-specific bargaining power against an individual employer. By
requiring industry-wide rather than localized bargaining, the reforms
threatened to paralyze the mass of unionized voices that had been enabled by
the new grass-roots union structure.
5' See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 235.
56 See id.
S7 See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 68.
" See Lansing, supra note 2, at 301 (describing the overarching governmental policy of
"prohibiting black participation in the political process").
9 See Hepple, supra note 2, at 68; Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 235.
See Lansing, supra note 2, at 301.
6' See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 235.
62 See id.
63 See id.
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Aside from assimilation and paralysis, the reforms embodied a second
tactic for curbing black union strength. They sought to "divide and rule" the
trade unions by conferring the amendments' benefits upon certain groups of
black workers but excluding other significant portions of the African labor
force." Among the categories of excluded workers were agricultural laborers,
domestic service employees, a great many of which were African women, and
migrant workers.65 Thus, only black males working in otherwise all-white
urban areas were even marginally benefitted.' All others received no new
rights.
Remarkably, the reforms failed to produce the desired effect. For one, the
unions recognized the potentially divisive effects of these amendments.
Angered by these attempts at cooption, a number of them simply refused to
register.67 Nevertheless, they continued to make their presence felt. As of
1982, 150 different employers had agreed to recognize unregistered unions.6
This concerted effort resulted in a parliamentary concession recognizing
migrant workers to be within the reforms' ambit.69 Even after this compro-
mise, some unions continued to hold out and eventually won further conces-
sions, such as the right to form racially mixed unions.7"
This failure to disempower, therefore, resulted in an accumulation of
momentum in quite the opposite direction. Black union membership, and
indeed union membership overall, only increased in subsequent years. By
1983, unions enjoyed a total membership of 1.5 million workers. This
represented an increase of 500,000 since 1979, nearly all of it coming from the
African workforce.7' In addition, as of 1985, total membership in unregistered
unions had risen to 520,000.72 This overall growth, along with "the massive
consolidation of trade union organisation through the Federation of South
African Trade Unions (Fosatu) and then Cosatu" produced victories, such as
"See id.
65 See id. at 236. By "migrant workers," it is meant that a large segment of Africans who
were not permitted to live within the mostly white industrial towns with their families but who
instead carried a pass that permitted them to enter into the towns to work and, perhaps, to live
in worker compounds. They were considered domiciled in one of the all-African homelands
outside the townships. See STEPHEN R. LEWIS, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID 51-55
(1990).
" See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 236.
67 See id. at 237; Hepple, supra note 2, at 68.
" See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 170.
69 See id.
70 See LIPTON, supra note 22, at 68.
"' See Mitchell & Russell, supra note 2, at 238.
7 See id.
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a "second round of wage increases," much like the increases of a decade
earlier.73
Thus the black unions, unlike almost every other vehicle of organized
African empowerment, were surviving the government's attempts at
emasculating them. Indeed, the overall effect of the post-Weihahn reforms
was the granting of "a degree of political space where black South Africans
could engage in legal forms of association and organization effectively denied
them elsewhere." '74 Much as the IC had observed in the Gana case, the unions
became the one effective forum for African discontent over the apartheid
system as a whole. They became, in the words of one scholar, 'schools for
democracy'-if not yet 'schools for revolution.' "
The unions, however, did not operate alone in beginning the dismantling
of apartheid. Indeed, two other provisions in the Amendment Act proved even
more helpful to the movement despite having quite the opposite legislative
intent. The Amendment Act provided for the bringing of unfair labor practice
charges and for the IC to adjudicate the charges.76
The potential danger in these provisions came first from the remarkably
ambiguous definition of "unfair labor practice." As originally enacted in
October 1979, an unfair labor practice was defined as anything that struck the
court as unfair.77 Less than a year later, Parliament enacted an only slightly
more detailed definition.78 The new definition encompassed any labor practice
or change in labor practice, except for strikes and lockouts, having the effect
of unfairly prejudicing employees or employers, creating labor unrest, or
detrimentally affecting employer-employee relationships. 79 This ambiguity,
according to a number of critics, represented not poor legislative drafting, but
a deliberate attempt to reserve considerable latitude in the government to
thwart union activity by declaring it unfair and to grant unions virtually no
notice of what would eventually constitute unfair labor practices.8"
Moreover, the political and discretionary nature of the IC's powers, as
established in the organic provision, sought to ensure that the tribunal would
never operate free from state influence. Its members were to be selected by
7' BOND, supra note 33, at 31.
74 Id.
7 Id. (quoting A. Erwin, On Unions and Politics, paper presented to the ASSA Conference,
University of Cape Town, July 1985).
76 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 186.
7 See id. at 189.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See, e.g., id. at 189; Lansing, supra note 2, at 301,
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the Minister of Manpower based upon familiarity with the law and
"'competence to perform.' ,,s' The latter criterion has been criticized as
merely a tool for screening out candidates based on their political sentiments.8"
Moreover, the Minister of Manpower retained the power both to dismiss active
members of the IC and to appoint an indefinite number of new members as the
minister saw fit.83 Finally, past adjudications would not bind the members of
this quasi-judicial body in reaching their ad hoc conclusions in any given
unfair labor practice case.8 In so structuring this tribunal, Parliament
apparently envisioned a body of politically like-minded adjudicators who
could be appointed when need be and could be counted on to render decisions
favorable to the established system of apartheid.
Inexplicably, however, the IC envisioned its role differently. Rather than
serve as an enemy to the active role of black unions in the workplace and in
the nation's political process as a whole, it became an "accomplice" in the
movement toward democracy." In making discretionary decisions regarding
what did and did not constitute an unfair labor practice, the court began to
develop "an equitable, nonracial system of labor law.
816
In order to do so, the IC first had to conceive of its purpose as more than
merely applying the letter of the statutory law. Indeed, it regarded its
decisions concerning unfair labor practices as involving more than "pure
law."8" In justifying this approach, the court pointed to the ambiguity in the
definition of "unfair labor practice" as evidence of an implicit power given by
the legislature to develop this new body of law. 8 It also made clear that the
concept of unfair labor practice still operated even outside of the collective
bargaining relationship.89 The court also found that actions lawful in other
" Coleman, supra note 2, at 187 (quoting from the Labour Relations Act, No. 28 of 1956
as amended, § 17(1)(b)).
See id.
* See id.
8 See id.
8 See id. at 178. For a case study in the role of the South African judiciary in battling other
aspects of the apartheid system, see Mark Andrew Green, What Role Can South African Judges
Play in Mitigating Apartheid?: A Study of the Urban African Legal Regime, 1987 WiS. L. REV.
325 (1987).
86 Coleman, supra note 2, at 189; see also LIPTON, supra note 22, at 68 (noting that "the new
Industrial Court was making decisions favourable to black unions fighting for recognition and
protection against victimization by some employers").
87 Metal & Allied Workers Union v. Natal Die Casting Co., (1986) 7 I.L.J. 520,544 (LAC).
88 See SA Diamond Workers Union v. Master Diamond Cutters Assoc. of SA, (1981) 3 I.L.J.
87, 101, 108-09 (LAC).
89 See id. at 113.
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portions of the act (e.g., dismissing strikers) could, nonetheless, under the
particular circumstances of a case, constitute an unfair labor practice.'
By wielding its power in this way, the IC carved out of the statute a more
equitable concept of the unfair labor practice than the statute allowed on its
face. For example, despite the absence of an explicit duty to bargain in good
faith, the court nonetheless felt free to determine that a party's bad faith
bargaining, in light of all the facts in the case at hand, was an unfair labor
practice.9
In issues of worker dismissals and discrimination, the statute again was
relatively silent. And again, the IC stepped in to supplement the lack of
protection afforded workers. For instance, while the act allowed for the
dismissal of striking workers, the court held that an employer could not
dismiss them for striking in response to the employer's unfair labor practice.'
Moreover, while the act appeared not to outlaw specifically the dismissal of
workers based on their union affiliation, the IC found unfair certain discrimi-
natory activities such as granting benefits only to unaffiliated workers.93
Thus, the IC, through its statutorily granted powers and independent
conception of its role in adjudicating unfair labor practice claims, proceeded
to punch hole after hole in the act's restrictive provisions. The court appeared
to have taken aim at those areas in which the statute allowed the employer, in
subtle and even blatant ways, to corrode the union's effectiveness. Further, the
court took upon itself the duty to ensure good faith in collective bargaining, to
mitigate discriminatory activities, and even to ensure that a lockout, ostensibly
excluded from the act's definition of an unfair labor practice, did not function
as something other than simply an economic weapon used in vying for
favorable collective bargaining terms.94 Thus, the hoped-for cooption of
registered black trade unions was impeded again and again by IC adjudica-
tions.
In 1988, Parliament responded by altering, once again, the definition of
unfair labor practice. As before, the definition included greater detail. It set
out a list of fourteen distinct unfair labor practices and incorporated the old
9o See Metal & Allied Workers Union, (1986) 7 I.L.J. at 544.
9' See Coleman, supra note 2, at 191-92.
See Natal Die Casting Co. Ltd. v. President of the Indus. Court, (1987) 8 I.L.J. 245, 246
(LAC).
9' See National Union of Mineworkers v. Henry Gould Ltd., (1988) 9 I.L.J. 1145, 1159
(LAC).
" In Sithole v. Federated Timbers Ltd., (1989) 10 I.L.J. 517, 521 (LAC), the IC found a
lockout to be a prima facie unfair labor practice if the employees had already acceded to the
employer's demands for which the lockout purportedly was brought.
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definition as an additional catch-all category. 95 In so doing, Parliament
attempted to shift the emphasis from considerations of fairness to strict
statutory interpretation.96
The IC, however, continued to operate in the same manner as before when
adjudicating unfair labor practice charges. Indeed, in twenty decisions made
under the more recent 1991 definition, the IC made reference only four times
to specifically codified unfair labor practices. Instead, the court chose to focus
on the still present catch-all provision and its own self-proclaimed discretion
to make rulings based upon the act's overarching policy of promoting
collective bargaining.97
The IC further chose to continue its support for black unions and their role
in addressing apartheid by making favorable rulings. It also, on occasion,
made sweeping statements such as the one from the Gana case mentioned
earlier, in which it recognized the unions as the sole organized voice for the
mass of disenfranchised Africans. In that same opinion, the court went on to
encourage the government to allow participation of black unions in the
formulation of future labor legislation.98 Thus, the IC granted these organiza-
tions not only assistance in shaping a favorable body of law but also a very
real sense of institutional legitimacy in their function as a significant political
force.
For these reasons, the labor relations laws of South Africa ultimately had
exactly the opposite effect of that which was intended. Oppressive restrictions
enraged their victims and encouraged them to discover the freeing power of
speaking in collective voices. Measures intended to coopt the influence of the
black trade unions, in fact, gave those organizations a legitimacy and a
leverage in the labor community that they had never before enjoyed as legally
marginalized groups. Moreover, later amendments introduced the unions to
a remarkable ally, the Industrial Court, which wielded its discretion in an
unexpected manner. That tribunal's sympathetic attitude toward the
disenfranchised black workers and the workers' one true vehicle for change
resulted in the creation of a favorable body of case law that firmly established
the unions as a legitimate industrial and political force. The IC's favorable
attitude toward black workers also led to the use of the concept of unfair labor
practices to level a deliberately uneven playing field.
9 See Coleman, supra note 2, at 196.
96 See id. at 197.
9' See id. at 200-01 (citing Nasionale Suiwekooperasie v. Food & Allied Workers, (1989)
10 I.L.J. 712, 716 (LAC)).98 See Gana Bldg. Materials, (1990) 11 I.L.J. at 574.
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The pivotal role played by the unions in altering one of the largest facets
of life for so many black South Africans eventually encouraged the unions to
involve themselves in other aspects of African life. Thus, unions became a
champion of political as well as industrial causes (inasmuch as the two
concepts may be kept separate). They banded together with political parties
(as in the COSATU-ANC alliance mentioned earlier) to transform the realities
that affected all Africans and not merely the employed. In addition, the
volume with which the unions spoke shook the foundations of the apartheid
government. As the movement grew, a change became more and more
inevitable. What remained to be seen, however, was how this government,
faced with its own mortality, would react to this critical mass of enraged South
Africans.
III. REVOLUTION?
The beginning of the end of apartheid came in February 1990 when Prime
Minister F. W. de Klerk declared the lifting of all legal restrictions upon the
African population in South Africa.99 Five years would pass before a draft of
the new Labour Relations Act ("New Act") was published in 1995.'00 Another
year and a half would pass before the statute would in fact be enacted.
In the meantime, Act 200 of 1993, better known as the "interim constitu-
tion," came into effect. The preamble to the interim constitution ostensibly
eradicated all forms of discrimination" 'between men and women and people
of all races.' "''o The very same act, however, sheltered the old act from any
constitutional attack until such time as a new labor statute could be drafted and
implemented. 2 Presumably, then, the IC also continued its work under the
old act in carving out and maintaining a sort of rough equity between
management on the one hand and workers and unions on the other. Neverthe-
less, there was a lingering sense that a significant reworking of labor relation
laws in South Africa was needed instead of piecemeal judicial re-legislation.' 3
Also driving the need for reform was South Africa's membership in the
Industrial Labour Organization (ILO), which the nation renewed as the New
" See Hepple, supra note 2, at 56.
10 See du Toit, supra note 17, at 785.
'10 A. A. Landman, Statutory Inroads into a Trade Union's Right of Disassociation, 18
INDUs. L. J. 13, 15 (1997) (citing the preamble to the constitution of South Africa).
102 See id.
"03 See generally Industrial Labour Office, Prelude to Change: Industrial Relations Reform
in South Africa, 13 INDus. L.J. 739 (1992) (reporting the labor concerns before reform in South
Africa).
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Act was being drafted. This rededication, as reflected in the New Act's final
form, led one scholar to declare the statute "[a] synthesis between human
rights and employment ights... given that the explicit objectives of the Act
include the implementation of ILO conventions and the elimination of the
legacy of apartheid in the workplace."' '° One such ILO convention, the
Convention on Freedom of Association, for example, led drafters to include
in the New Act a prohibition against gender or racial discrimination by either
unions or employer organizations.105
The provisions of the New Act receiving perhaps the greatest attention,
however, involve not prohibitions but the partial implementation of a new
model of labor relations known as workplace forums."° These forums can
alternatively represent the greatest emblem of how far the country has come
since apartheid or the greatest threat to the progress that has been made. In the
former view, their structure and method of operation are a fulfillment, even if
flawed, of the dream of a democratic workplace. In the latter view, they
threaten to neutralize the raw force of the collective worker voice by partially
displacing the unions as worker representatives, by setting up potential
conflicts between unions and workplace forums in representational matters,
and by failing to empower enough workers to establish forums if they so
choose. While it is true that the New Act's goal of increasing industrial
cooperation and reducing confrontation may encourage the resolution of
disputes in a less adversarial manner, to view these workplace forum
provisions as a true threat to the power of collective opposition is to ignore
completely the nature of such opposition in relation to the governing regime.
A. Focus: Workplace Forums
Perhaps the one true innovation of the New Act in the landscape of South
African labor relations has been the enactment of provisions regarding
workplace forums."0 7 Such forums have existed in other countries for some
'04 Roger Welch, Collectivism Versus Individualism in Employee Relations: For Human
Rights at the Workplace, 17 INDus. L.J. 1041, 1052 (1996).
'0' See Landman, supra note 101, at 16 (discussing certain requirements that the union's
constitution must meet).
'o See §§ 78-94 of Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (S. Aft.) [hereinafter New Act].
t See Maurius Olivier, Workplace Forums: Critical Questions from a Labour Law
Perspective, 17 INDus. L.J. 803, 803-05 (1996); Paul Benjamin & Carole Cooper, Innovation
and Continuity: Responding to the Labour Relations Bill, 16 INDus. L.J. 258, 266 (1995).
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time,' °8 and the statute draws much of its inspiration from European models."°
The avowed purpose behind encouraging workplace forums is "to facilitate a
shift, at the workplace, from adversarial collective bargaining on all matters
to joint problem-solving and participation on certain subjects.""0 Those
"certain subjects" in which the legislature envisions cooperative efforts rather
than adversarial postures generally fall into the category of "production" issues
or "decisions that affect [workers] in their daily work activities."' Such
issues include, for example, plant closures, product development, criteria for
merit increases, and disciplinary codes and procedures." 2 "Distributive"
decisions, such as the division of the enterprise's profits among workers,
owners, shareholders, and others,"3 however, remain the domain of traditional
collective bargaining."
4
These new provisions and their cooperative model seek to provide two very
distinct benefits. First, they seek to democratize the workplace. In fact, the
legislature's Explanatory Memorandum rings with democratic sentiment when
it asserts that "[w]orkplace forums expand worker representation beyond the
limits of collective bargaining by providing workers with an institutionalized
voice in managerial decisions.""' 5 Indeed, the New Act as a whole aims to
promote a more egalitarian workplace, and a prominent vehicle of that
envisioned goal necessarily is worker participation in decision making."
6
The benefit that finds explicit and repeated mention in the Explanatory
Memorandum, however, is greater efficiency and productivity." 7 By drawing
upon the unique experiences and insights of workers and by opening a direct
line of communication between employees and management, workplace
to$ Three such countries are Japan, Germany, and Sweden. See Clyde Summers, Workplace
Forums from a Comparative Perspective, 16 INDUS. L.J. 806, 807 (1995). A fourth country, the
United States, has experienced "marked failure" in encouraging and implementing workplace
forums. See id.
'0' See Ministerial Legal Task Team, Explanatory Memorandum, January 1995, 16 INDUS.
L.J. 278, 310-11 (1995) (hereinafter Memorandum) (naming countries where workplace
restructuring has been successful).
"o Id. at 310.
"' Olivier, supra note 107, at 803-04.
u2 For a more comprehensive list, see id. at 804-05.
'" See Summers, supra note 108, at 807.
" See Olivier, supra note 107, at 807.
"s Memorandum, supra note 109, at 310; see also Olivier, supra note 107, at 805
(identifying in the workplace forum provisions an intent to promote democracy in the
workplace).
16 See New Act § l(d)(iii); see also Olivier, supra note 107, at 807 (noting that promoting
employee participation is a primary objective of the New Act).
'7 See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 109, at 310-11.
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forums in other countries have ensured more carefully contemplated and,
ultimately, more productive decisions.
118
The New Act allows for three variations on this cooperative theme. In the
first of them, the New Act's provisions completely regulate the forum's
operations.' 9 In the second variation, the statute allows for a collective
bargaining agreement that will set the structure, procedures, and subject
matters covered by the forum. Finally, a collective bargaining agreement
could regulate certain aspects of the forum while leaving the rest to the New
Act's coverage.
1 20
In the statutory variant, which applies only to enterprises employing at least
100 workers, excluding managerial staff, ' the process of forming a workplace
forum can only be initiated by a union representing a majority of all workers
at the site and not simply from a union claiming majority support of a
particular bargaining unit.22 Members of the forum, however, may be elected
from among all workers at the site, not simply that union's members." The
employer is completely excluded from involvement. 24
Once in place, the statutory forum enjoys certain rights in relation to that
site's management that are the linchpin of the workplace forum system. In
regard to certain issues, the forum has the right to consultation. The employer
may not simply ask the forum's opinion on a proposed decision; the employer
must confer with the aim of reaching consensus."z Moreover, the forum may
suggest alternatives, which the employer must give reasons for rejecting.' 6
On other subjects, the employer has the duty to engage in joint decision
making with the forum. Not only must they aim for a consensus, they must
also achieve it.' 27 Should they fail to do so, the dispute must go to third-party
arbitration orbe referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and
Arbitration, an independent body established to resolve labor disputes.'2
" See id. at 311; see also Summers, supra note 108, at 806 ("Workers... know things about
the reality of production processes in the workplace, the causes of defective products, lost time
and work injuries, and the potential for improvement which management never learns.").
"9 See New Act §§ 78(a), 80(1).
120 See Olivier, supra note-107, at 804.
121 See New Act § 80(1).
'22 See id. §§ 78(b), 80(2); Olivier, supra note 107, at 809.
', See New Act § 82(1)(h); Benjamin & Cooper, supra note 107, at 266.
14 See Olivier, supra note 107, at 804.
'2s See New Act § 85(l).
'2 See id. § 85(2)-(3); Olivier, supra note 107, at 804.
127 See New Act § 86(4)(a).
'2 See id. § 86(4)(a).
129 See i. §§ 86(4)(b), 113, 115.
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Moreover, in either mode of cooperative activity, the employer must provide
the forum with all relevant information necessary to represent its members
completely. 30
At first blush, then, these forums appear to give employees a freer and
stronger voice in the workplace than the voice (if any) enjoyed by any of their
disenfranchised predecessors. Moreover, its greater strength may well come
from the cooperative rather than adversarial methods of operation. One
scholar, in reviewing the New Act in proposed form in 1995, argued that "[t]he
worker's voice cannot be shouts of protests or demands, answered by the
employer's assertion of management prerogatives..''. Rather, a democratic
workplace could only become a reality when management demonstrated "a
willingness to share in problem solving and a willingness to consider
employees not as suppliers of hours of labour but as partners in the
enterprise."'3 2 As such, the New Act does, on the surface, seem poised to
facilitate the beginning of a truly cooperative labor climate.
These provisions, however, might not in fact be the vehicle of true
democracy in the workplace. Rather, some critics view them as flawed at best
and sorely insufficient at worst. Indeed, one such critic has opined that
participation in decision making cannot realistically be seen
as industrial democracy in the true sense of the word. At best
it reflects inroads into management prerogative, but certainly
not industrial democracy in the sense that the collective voice
of the workers will constitute or even determine the eventual
business decision to be implemented in the enterprise.'
The perceived weaknesses underlying such skepticism fall into a number of
categories, the most prominent of which may be classified as structural and
theoretical.
The structural problems begin with the requirement that the statute govern
only workplaces comprised of at least 100 workers."3  South African
businesses tend to be organized into multiple worksites with smaller numbers
of employees. This proves especially true in the retail and service sectors,
130 See id. § 89(1).
131 Id.
132 Summers, supra note 108, at 806.
133 Olivier, supra note 107, at 806.
'" Workplaces of less than 100 workers can, of course, establish forums via collective
bargaining agreement. See New Act § 81 (1); Olivier, supra note 107, at 803. For the purposes
of this discussion, however, analysis will be restricted to the statutory variant.
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which employ thousands of workers but often see them organized in numerous
separate sites. Many of these workplaces do not reach this statutory threshold
of 100.'"3 This minimum might also exclude up to 74 percent of the formal
sector from the New Act's coverage. 36
The legislature claims to have chosen the 100 employee minimum on the
belief that larger workplaces generally possess the resources and skills
necessary to operate such forums successfully.'37 Whether or not this will
prove a correct belief remains to be determined. What is sure is that the South
African system stands alone in this regard. European models set their
thresholds significantly lower. For example, Germany set its threshold at five
workers, and the Netherlands set the threshold at thirty-five.'
The second structural weakness in the workplace forum provisions is the
prominent role given to a union representing the majority of workers at a
workplace. As mentioned earlier, section 80(2) of the New Act allows only
such majority unions to initiate the genesis of a statutory-variant forum at a
worksite. Because a workplace in which a single union represents the majority
of the employees (i.e., a particular bargaining unit encompasses a majority of
the workers at the site) is the exception rather than the rule, such a requirement
could have the same limiting effect that the 100-worker ceiling threatens."'
What is more, this provision appears to be an attempt to secure the status of
majority unions now in power. 40
This protected position the union enjoys also could have the effect of
weighting the forum's composition with union officers.' 4' While the New Act
itself calls for any worker to be eligible to be a candidate for a stewardship in
the forum, 42 the influence that this central union could have on how the
workers vote should not be discounted. Nor should the potential for union
'.. See Benjamin & Cooper, supra note 107, at 266.
136 See id. But the authors posit that this fear may be based on "an overly literal interpretation
of the definition of a 'workplace.'" See id. If somehow "workplace" were construed to mean
all of the units comprising the enterprise of a single employer, the threshold may not exclude
many workplaces at all. This may, however, raise even greater difficulties with the requirement
that a majority union in the workplace initiate the forum's genesis.
117 See id. at 267.
138 See id.
131 See Olivier, supra note 107, at 809.
140 See id. at 810.
141 See id. at 810-11; Summers, supra note 108, at 810.
42 See Memorandum, supra note 109, at 314-15. But note that, while the union may simply
nominate a candidate, an individual not backed by the union must obtain signatures from a fixed
percentage of employees before he or she may campaign. See id.
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cooption of the forum as simply another arm of its own influence" go
unwatched. Such a result would be anathema to the forum's ostensibly
democratic, cooperative nature.'"
After a forum has been in existence, moreover, the majority union may
trigger a ballot vote by which the forum may be dissolved.' 4 It is unclear why
the forum should not take on a life of its own once it has been created.'4
Indeed, the potential for partisanship in forum agenda appears far greater when
it must act under the looming threat of dissolution by the largest faction of
workers. Moreover, this in no way facilitates the separation of functions and
jurisdictions, discussed below, that is crucial to preventing adversarial attitudes
from infiltrating the forum's activities.
A third structural problem with the South African workplace forum
provisions concems the forums power to force employers to address the issues
over which the statute grants the forums jurisdiction. Indeed, the forum lacks
any power to demand that an employer engage in joint decision making with
it on an issue the forum wishes to raise on its own. Rather, the forum only
holds the right to be consulted on changes the employer has announced a
desire to implement. 147 The only exception to this rule is the limited ability to
demand consultation on the issues of merit criteria, discretionary bonuses,
disciplinary procedures, and punishment for non-work related conduct. 48
Thus the forum's activities largely may be reactive but not proactive. This
limitation threatens to ensure that these forums never truly enable a democratic
workplace in its purest form-that is, a workplace in which employees' voices
determine rather than simply modify the course of the enterprise. 9
A fourth, more practical, difficulty involves the act's separations between
productive and distributive issues (the former being the domain of the forum
and the latter the domain of traditional collective bargaining) and between
plant-level and more centralized activity (again the former belonging to the
forum and the latter to collective bargaining). Both distinctions entail
"4 See Summers, supra note 108, at 810 ("There may be, in fact or substance, a single
consultation or negotiation with the prospect of a strike to resolve the dispute."). In the German
model, on the other hand, 75 percent of all forum stewards are also union members, but they are
not officers in the union. See id. at 811.
'" See id.
'" See New Act § 93(1); Olivier, supra note 107, at 811-12.
'"See Olivier, supra note 107, at 812.
147 See New Act §§ 84(1), 86(1); Olivier, supra note 107, at 805.
148 See New Act § 87; Olivier, supra note 107, at 805.
4'" See Olivier, supra note 107, at 806.
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jurisdictional divisions that may prove both confusing and ultimately
impracticable.
The production-distribution distinction is a potential source of dispute over
who should serve as the workers' representative-the forum or the union-in
any given matter. 50 While one may imagine issues that fall squarely within
one category or another (e.g., product development and export promotion
clearly are issues of production, while wages clearly are distributive), these
two labels may well be two end points on a continuum rather than two
concepts each with a unique character. Criteria for merit increases, for
example, though statutorily considered a production issue,' could reasonably
appear to involve a consideration of"a division of returns from the enterprise,
how much goes to workers and how much goes to the owners or
shareholders."' 52
Clearly the New Act's actual language vitiates the possibility of confusion
over who is the appropriate representative in merit increase criteria disputes.
Nevertheless, the stage may be set for the appearance of an issue not yet
enumerated in the New Act. 53 Who then may step in as the employees'
mouthpiece will depend upon interpretation of the New Act. On the one hand,
the New Act may be construed to require that any issue not explicitly given to
the forum's jurisdiction fall to the traditional collective bargaining process.'
This interpretation, however, could severely restrict the power of the more
democratic vehicle to effect a cooperative solution to issues. Moreover, it
might grant the unions power to bargain collectively over topics that
empirically might be characterized as productive simply because the topics
had not been spelled out in the statutory language.
This reading, however, ignores the legislative intent behind the implemen-
tation of the forum provisions. The Explanatory Memorandum speaks of the
"focus" of the forums as "qualitative-that is, on non-wage matters.' ' 5  After
observing the labor relations landscape in a number of other countries, the
"So See id. at 807-08.
'" As discussed earlier, the New Act requires the employer to consult the forum on this issue.
New Act § 84.
252 Summers, supra note 108, at 807.
. Cf. Benjamin & Cooper, supra note 107, at 267 ("For instance, will issues such as profit-
sharing and production-linked bonuses be bargained collectively or co-determined?").
"4 Cf. id. at 267 ("Ultimately, it will be for NEDLAC [the National Economic, Development
and Labour Council, a coalition of labor, industry, and community leaders established for
consultation during the drafting and enacting of the statute] to negotiate which issues will be
bargained over collectively and which are for worker co-determination."). This comment might
suggest that only those issues explicitly granted to a party will be in its jurisdiction. See id.
s Memorandum, supra note 109, at 310.
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legislature concluded that collective bargaining was "not well suited" to the
task of arriving at consensual solutions to disputes involving these matters.s
Presumably, then, adversarial collective bargaining is well-suited to the
function of resolving wage-related issues. Indeed, some see these topics as
"too often inescapably confrontational, reducing the parties to fighting over
shares of the pie which are too small to satisfy either side."'
57
Thus it is the nature of the issue and of the institution that should decide
who must take charge of a given dispute. Indeed, some critics concur in this
assessment of the relative capacities of the two institutions and in the view that
this is a necessary division of functions.' This separation is supported by
European models. 59 Nevertheless, proponents of the conceptual distinction
give little guidance as to how one maintains the practical distinction when the
workplace encounters a dispute over an issue not yet enumerated in the
provisions whose nature is not clearly distributive or productive.
As one might imagine, confusion over this preliminary issue could undercut
the effectiveness of both vehicles because the workers may lack a clear idea
of whom to look to as their champion. A fragmented shop-floor voice could
result in both an internal worker dispute (augmented by the territoriality of the
two institutions) and an employer's understandable unwillingness to converse
with either representative for fear of talking to the wrong one or of receiving
mixed signals from its employees."6 The cooperative atmosphere necessary
for a cooperative workplace would quickly disintegrate into directionless
adversarialism.
The interrelated central-versus-local-activity distinction could further
complicate this jurisdictional confusion. The New Act anticipates that
workplace forums will operate at the plant level. For instance, each plant
owned by any given employer may have its own forum. Collective bargaining,
on the other hand, is to happen at the centralized (or "industry") level. For
example, the employer will bargain once with a union or union coalition over
"6 Id. at 310-11.
'57 Summers, supra note 108, at 807.
158 See id. at 807. But see du Toit, supra note 17, at 789 (arguing that the nature of the topics
in these two categories are not so different at all and that what will determine ultimately whether
cooperation or adversarialism will be employed in addressing any given issue is the attitudes of
the parties involved).
159 See Summers, supra note 108, at 807.
'o Cf Benjamin & Cooper, supra note 107, at 268 ("Demarcation disputes between forums,
confusion among workers and managers, factionalism and divisions within unions between shop
stewards and forum members, and the 'shunting of issues back and forth between the forums'
are some of the potential difficulties that have been raised.").
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distributive issues for all the employees it represents at all the plants the
employer operates.' The separation attempts to avoid an infiltration of
adversarialism in the local, cooperative efforts of the forums.' 62
A problem arises, however, out of the unique labor relations landscape
already existing in South Africa. Historically, unions have mainly operated
locally. In recent years, more centralized bargaining councils have developed
per statutory provision, but plant-level supplementary bargaining by unions
has continued. 63 Indeed, employers and unions alike appear to prefer such
localized bargaining to the more unwieldy task of arriving at an industry-wide
collective bargaining agreement.14
At present, therefore, workers have two very different representatives
operating on the shop floor. 65 The potential for confusion similar to that
discussed earlier clearly exists. To whom should the employees turn when a
given dispute arises? Moreover, the prominent place of the majority union in
the forum's existence and the potential for a workplace forum composed
largely of officers in the majority union will only contribute to this confusion
and even, perhaps, to cooptation of the forum's essential functions."
Solutions to these potential difficulties have been suggested. The
centralized bargaining councils must effectively limit the role of local unions
in bargaining at the plant level. 6 This will hopefully eliminate the possibility
of the spillover of adversarial sentiment into the forum as well as make the
local union less visible and, therefore, reduce the temptation of workers to look
to it for help on a distributive issue. Moreover, an amendment to the effect
that union officers may not also hold positions in the workplace forum would
perhaps "give some formal separation of identity between the two institu-
tions."' Such an amendment would also ensure that the agenda of one does
not filter into the agenda of the other. At the time of the writing of this Note,
however, these proposals were given serious consideration only in scholarship.
161 See Memorandum, supra note 109, at 312.
" See id. One scholar notes that, in the United States, plant-level bargaining to elaborate
on centrally-negotiated collective bargaining agreements instills an adversarial tone in local
worker coalition that in turn infects worker forum discussions with the employer and renders the
forums a failure in their ultimate task of consensus-building and cooperation. See Summers,
supra note 108, at 807.
' See Summers, supra note 108, at 807-09.
'"See Olivier, supra note 107, at 812-13.
165 See Summers, supra note 108, at 810.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 810.
'I d. at 811.
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In addition, two theoretical considerations may serve only to perpetuate the
practical difficulties of implementing this new system. These conceptual
issues both entail an analysis of how the New Act conceives of the role of the
workplace forum in South African labor relations. First, the statute clearly
views the forum model as a "supplement" to traditional collective bargaining
and not as a replacement for it. 169 This limited conception of the role of the
forums might well lend them far less institutional legitimacy than they will
need in order to operate as distinct, independent, and truly democratic
representatives of all South African workers. How much this attitude will
characterize the actual implementation and regulation of the statutory-variant
forums remains to be seen. Potential may well exist, however, given the New
Act's inherent vision to restrict the purpose of the forums to that of collective
bargaining's butler.
The second conceptual difficulty involves not the role of the forum in
relation to its adversarial counterpart but the ends sought to be achieved by the
enactment of these provisions. As discussed at the beginning of this analysis,
the twin aims of the workplace forum provisions appear to be greater
efficiency and productivity as well as the democratization of the workplace.
These two aims are complimentary only in the sense that drawing upon the
unique shop-floor insights of workers will enable more informed, and
ultimately more productive, decisions. On a broader level, however, the direct
effects of these two goals serve different parties. Democratization would
benefit disenfranchised workers while productivity most immediately benefits
owners, shareholders, and other vested interests in the enterprise."0 Should a
conflict arise in which both aims cannot be served equally, the question then
is, which aim should take precedence?..'
How that question is answered could have a great impact upon the course
of the forum's development or ultimate obsolescence. Indeed, how that
question is answered may impact how the legislature will address the structural
difficulties more than any other considerations. If lawmakers choose to exalt
democracy over efficiency in addressing head-on conflicts, this preference
could spill over into choices of, for example, whether the union or the forum
should address any gray-area topic with the employer. Favoring democratiza-
tion would render resolution of that issue in favor of the union, the less
democratic institution, unless the nature of the topic clearly demands it.
'69 See Memorandum, supra note 109, at 310; see also Olivier, supra note 107, at 807
(discussing forums as "supplement" or "alternative').
'7 See Memorandum, supra note 109, at 310.
" Cf. Olivier, supra note 107, at 807 (noting this tension between the aims).
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Ultimately, the difficulties inherent in the New Act's workplace forum
experiment leave South African workers in a sort of limbo. On the one hand,
unions are partially displaced by these new cooperative vehicles. It is a strike
against adversarial action. On the other hand, the forum provisions are
plagued by a number of difficulties, including tremendous holes in coverage,
limitations on the forum's power to initiate or participate in industrial dispute
resolution, potential conflicts between forum and union, and a confusion over
the ultimate aims of this new labor innovation (efficiency or democracy).
Thus, even if the time is right for South African industry to jettison more
confrontational means of dispute resolution (the topic of the following
section), the cooperative model set in its place is ill-equipped for the task at
hand. The South African legislature, therefore, must in the near future make
a choice. It must seek to resolve the difficulties inherent in the forum as
constructed and therefore empower more fully this democratic industrial
vehicle, or it must abandon the idea and recognize once again collective
bargaining as the desired method of resolving all disputes. As it stands now,
too much potential for confusion and frustration exists.
B. One Further Step Back
In a broader sense, whether workplace forums succeed, and why, may tell
us more than anything else about the future of South Africa as a nation.
Indeed, while workplace forums have been described as perhaps the more
"democratic" organized labor institution (assuming the faults in their
implementation discussed above can be corrected), it is not clear at all that
ultimately they will work to complete or to preserve the hard-fought prize of
democracy in South Africa as a whole. We must take one further step back,
then, to examine these provisions in relation to other changes brought about
by the New Act-and, indeed, by a new South African government.
The first step in this analysis must be a determination of how far exactly
South Africa has progressed down the road toward democracy. One critic has
suggested that a nation passes through three stages during such a transition.
The first stage, which he calls "liberalization," entails a new "definition of
rights," not simply for an elite but for all citizens." 2 The second stage,
"democratization," is characterized by a "popular mobilization""'-3 -that is, a
recognition of and an empowerment by these new rights, which those
previously disenfranchised segments of the population enjoy for the first time.
'7 Hepple, supra note 2, at 56.
17 Id.
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A "redistributing of wealth and resources" marks the final stage, "socializa-
tion.'91
74
Where, then, is South Africa? The nation entered the first stage when de
Klerk announced in February 1990 that all political restrictions upon blacks
were lifted.'75 As of 1994, South Africa had entered the popular mobilization
phase. "'6 But how much progress, if any, has occurred since then?
The New Act had its birth in a time of significant legislative action on
many social fronts. A draft of it was published in February 1995, along with
"corresponding statutes applicable to the public, education, and agricultural
sectors."'7 7 These statutes all attempt to bring national laws into conformity
with the new constitution, a major tenet of which is the furtherance of
democracy and the end of discrimination. Thus power, rights, and the
resources necessary to vindicate them find new life in legislation that makes
them applicable to all members of South African society.
Moreover, the "proposition" that national "priorities have shifted from the
struggle for democratic rights to the struggle for economic and social
upliftmnent of the black majority"'78 further suggests the notion (on the part of
the government of South Africa, if no one else) that the old regime has been
completely dismantled and that the populace has mobilized itself for the job
of rebuilding and restructuring itself as a democracy. Now comes the task of
redistributing social, political, and monetary resources to those who have
lacked it before-the "social upliftment" phase.
This notion in turn has underpinned the legislature's belief that "[a]
corresponding shift from adversarial towards more participative industrial
relations [is] imperative," not only in improving South Africa's role in the
world market but also in achieving the socio-political aims of the aptly-named
"Reconstruction and Development Programme.""' T While earlier stages in the
transition may have admitted, and even called for, combative postures against
the prevailing hegemony, such a confrontational atmosphere cannot sustain the
process of socialization in the workplace or, presumably, in the nation as a
whole. Socialization is by its very nature a cooperative effort, allocating equal
power and responsibility to all.
Conversely stated, the adversarial nature of traditional collective bargaining
in the workplace and political/industrial actions such as strikes proved
174 Id.
1S See id.
176 See id.
n "du Toit, supra note 17, at 785.
179 Id. at 787.
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uniquely appropriate to the task of opposing a repressive government with no
interest in equality or cooperation with the African majority. Only by rising
up in these collective, agitated groups could the disenfranchised populace seize
the power that was theirs purely by virtue of their size and will. Only by
greater force could barriers erected and maintained by force be toppled. Once
the walls have toppled, however, adversarial actions presumably lose their
usefulness. More precisely, more constructive tools become necessary for
erecting the egalitarian political structure after the previous structure is
dismantled.
But the question still remains: is that where South Africa is? The
government has begun proceeding as if engaged in the process of socialization.
But how can we be sure just yet that it has not overestimated the progress
made? Hepple's three-stage theory presupposes a nation will progress in all
sectors, in all regions, at the same pace. Could not unforeseen resistance in the
educational sector, for example, cause it to lag behind others? In such a case,
adversarialism and not cooperation perhaps would stand the better chance of
quelling the resistance and bringing educational reform up to speed.
With this in mind, one scholar has suggested that an alternative-and more
sinister-purpose lurks behind the decision to enable and encourage the
kinder, gentler institution of workplace forums. By implementation of these
forums, trade unions and the potential for adversarial collectivism will be
defused.8 0 As Darcy du Toit writes,
A system of "cooperation" imposed from above might be
perceived as a device for disarming the union movement, not
necessarily by creating an organizational alternative in the
shape of workplace forums ... but, more insidiously, by
downplaying the importance of independent ("adversarial")
mobilization in the eyes of workers.'
Such an impression has its roots in the limitations on industrial action imposed
by the New Act. Whereas previously disputes could be pressed and strikes
called over all issues, including issues of basic "rights," the New Act draws a
distinction between industrial action over "rights" issues and industrial action
over "interest" issues. The latter is allowed, while the former is not.8 2
Moreover, the new Labour Court is given the "intrusive role" of interfering
,so See du Toit, supra note 17, at 790.
Is' Id.
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[Vol 28:595
TRADE UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
with strikes it considers wrongful and awarding damages against
participants.1
8 3
Further restrictions on industrial action arise from the granting of
jurisdiction to workplace forums over issues previously addressed by trade
unions. While the New Act does not necessarily prohibit striking over
"consultation" issues when no consensus may be reached, it does proscribe
industrial action over "joint decision making" issues.'" Proponents of
cooperative labor models have criticized the statute for allowing strikes in the
former situation. It does not go far enough, they complain, in working to
prevent the spillover of adversarial attitudes into the forums."'
This criticism, however, again presupposes the undesirability of more
confrontational models in the present-day socio-political landscape. As
suggested, that preference may not be so clear-cut. Indeed, at least the threat
of potential collective populist opposition may be desirable even in an
atmosphere of complete cooperation. Thus, one could complain that the New
Act encroaches too much upon a historically effective safeguard of the hard-
fought prize of an effective, democratic voice.
It may be a question, in other words, of who is watching the watchers.
While no one has questioned the dedication of the present national government
to the ideals of equality and democracy, even it can give no guarantees about
the faithfulness of future regimes to those same ideals. Would it perhaps not
be better to retain the one weapon that has proven its worth in enforcing such
tenets even in the face of so insidious, so virulent, and so stubborn an
opposition as the apartheid system?
Moreover, as du Toit has hinted, limiting the situations in which industrial
action may legally take place might have the effect of altering worker
perception of the role it could play in vindicating rights that have been
encroached upon.8 6 In this manner, the New Act may reduce the potential for
collectivism, not only by establishing certain prohibitions against it but also
by enabling a sort of atrophy. Given enough time, the sword of opposition
could rust unburnished until no longer fit for service as a guard against
creeping marginalization or stratification.
This has not happened yet, and it is important to note that the New Act does
not necessarily eliminate "the right of workers to participate in socio-economic
'g See id. at 790 n.19; see also New Act § 68(1)(a)-(b).
'" Olivier, supra note 107, at 813. For "joint decision making" issues, the act prescribes
mandatory arbitration. See New Act § 86(4)(a)-(b).
' See id.
'"See du Toit, supra note 17, at 792 (discussing the importance of worker participation in
protecting rights).
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protest action."'' 8 7 A 1997 ruling by the Labour Appeals Court appears to hold
that such action may proceed so long as the participants first comply with
certain alternative dispute resolution procedures.' 8 It may take several more
years, therefore, before it becomes clear exactly how deeply the workplace
provisions cut into the availability of such adversarial recourse. Du Toit and
others may find their worries never coming to fruition.
IV. CONCLUSION
One final point considers the true nature of collective opposition in relation
to the controlling laws of South Africa. Du Toit's characterization of such
movement as independent mobilization emphasizes the extent to which it
necessarily exists outside of the prevailing discourse. Indeed, it sets itself
against these controlling forces so that it might, by its opposition, end them.
It is, in Thoreau's words, a recognition of "the right of revolution; that is, the
right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or
its inefficiency are great and unendurable.' ' 9
Throughout the history of labor relations in South Africa, the government
has attempted to impose restrictions on the ability of discontented workers to
express corporately their dissatisfaction. As demonstrated in Part I, however,
such efforts ultimately failed. One may attribute such failure in part to the
Industrial Court, whose sympathy toward disenfranchised Africans took the
government completely by surprise. That tribunal used nebulous labor
legislation to chip away at the very power disparity it was enacted to maintain.
But that cannot fully explain the apartheid government's failure. Nor does
it help us to predict what effect, if any, the present workplace forum provisions
may have on either the labor relations landscape or the larger social one. It
may well be, as discussed in Part II, that these forums will present all South
African workers with a truly democratic workplace (subject to the correction
of certain flaws in the statutory scheme). Whether these same provisions will
help or harm the democratic project under way in South Africa as a whole
remains to be seen.
Certainly these provisions comprise the first potentially effective inroads
into the power of trade unions. The trade unions historically have enabled the
187 Carol Paton, COSATU Protest Action Divides Labour Court: Workplace Conflict, BUS.
TIMES (South Africa), May 11, 1997, available in LEXIS-NEXIS, World Library, TMLBT file.leg See id.
'9 Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in THE VARIORUM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 31,
34 (Walter Harding ed., 1967).
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voices of the marginalized. But to stop there in the analysis is to ignore the
lawless, "independent" nature of collective opposition. It exists as a check on
the movement of prevailing forces against the will of those "subjects" the
forces are intended to protect. Where the laws proscribe collective opposition
but the populace seeks a corporate voice, the laws eventually will give way,
in effect if not in substance.
Thoreau issued the challenge as follows: "Unjust laws exist: shall we be
content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them
until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once?"' Thoreau
preferred the last of these options. Historically, so too have the disenfran-
chised people of South Africa.
Thus, it may be that the worker forum provisions ultimately will not
hamper the ability of workers, either as workers or as citizens, to make known
their complaints and to seize the power that is theirs to force changes. Where
the law seeks to contain rather than reflect the will of society, laws will be
broken and eventually changed.
This South Africa knows from experience.
'9s Id. at 39.
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